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1THE STRUCTURE OF THE ASIAN DEBT CRISIS IN THEORETICAL AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE1
Thomas Ziesemer, Maastricht University, MERIT and Department of Economics, P.O.Box
616, NL - 6200 MD Maastricht; Phone: 31-43-3883872; fax: 31-43-3216518;e-
mail:[t.ziesemer@algec.unimaas.nl]. April 1998. Comments invited.
1.Introduction: 
This paper has been provoked by a student who told me that the Asian debt crisis was quite
different from the earlier debt crises after having read Krugman (1998a) . Having some
knowledge about the earlier debt crises (see Ziesemer 1997a) and having followed the news
on the Asian debt crisis I had more of a feeling ‘deja vu’. In particular, I saw an outstanding
role of the dollar revaluation which did beat those countries that had fixed exchange rates with
the dollar: This time the Asian countries and not Latin America whereas it had been the other
way around in the 1982 crisis, when the Asian countries had more flexible exchange rates
than the Latins. Of course, many differences between Asia and Latin America are obvious, but
is every thing really totally different? 
In this paper we will try to find the similarities and differences between earlier crises
and that in Asia. To understand the literature on the Asian debt crisis it is advantageous to
have some knowledge on earlier debt crises and of the development of the Asian economies
which we present in subsections 1.1 and 1.2. The structure of the rest of this article is as
follows. In section 2 we consider the Asian debt crisis, starting with the summary of five
rather controversial views in section 2.1 which differ mainly by the way how they emphasize
microeconomic and institutional, macroeconomic, domestic and international fundamentals.
From these we derive the topics on which the rest of this paper will concentrate. In section 2.2
we consider the various forms of financial excess and moral hazard on a country by country
basis to get some more differentiation into the debate from the point of view of
microeconomic and institutional fundamentals. In section 2.3 we discuss domestic
fundamentals which have been declared irrelevant by Krugman but have the sole emphasis
from Sachs. In section 2.4 we discuss the role of international fundamentals and the
revaluation of the US dollar. This leads to the question whether or not fixed exchanged rates
are a sustainable policy when the currency to which a country ties its own currency is
revalued, which is discussed in section 2.5. Another controversial point to be discussed in
section 2.6 is the issue of contagion. Once the crisis has occurred the question is what the
causes and consequences of real devaluations are; we turn to that in section 2.7. In section 3
we discuss special questions which seem to be the source of many mis- and non-
understandings. In section 3.1 we provokingly respond to the question ‘why didn’t anyone see
the Asian crisis coming’. In section 3.2 we make some remarks on the question of the
transmission of the crisis to Europe and the USA and  we show how one can be misled by not
differentiating between countries when discussing the crisis. In 3.3 we will discuss some
aspects of IMF policy. In 3.4 we briefly deal with the question ‘ Is the Asian miracle over?’.
Section 4 summarizes the major lessons and pitfalls and concludes.      
21.1 A typology of debt crises: Theory and History
A typology of debt crises can probably most easily constructed by beginning with a distinction
between single country crises and world economic crises. Debt crises in connection with
world economic crises were those of the 1930s and the 1982 crisis. For these crises it is
typical that there is an increase in world market interest rates and a world recession which
leads to a break down of investment and export demand. Export demand being crucial for the
payment of imported capital goods this leads to a major recession and an inability to pay the
debt service. It is clear that the current crisis in Asia is not a crisis accompanied by a world
recession or high world market interest rates. The only things that is common to all countries
currently is the development of the value of the US dollar, the yen and their own currency
values as well as the slow growth of Japan. To this we return later. 
Single country crises are typically viewed as foreign currency crises with speculative
attacks. The standard story (see Krugman 1979) says that they occur when countries finance
large government deficits with central bank money. The equilibrium exchange rate, if it were
flexible would undergo a devaluation. However, if countries have fixed exchange rates which
they try to keep unchanged, they have to sell foreign exchange reserves. The amount of
foreign exchange reserves being limited it is clear that this can be done only for some time.
Once reserves are down to zero the currency must be devalued. Domestic citizens knowing
that will try to hedge and therefore sell domestic currencies and buy foreign exchange; foreign
and domestic speculators knowing the same will take short positions in domestic currencies of
the deficit country, buy foreign exchange denominated assets expecting their debt to be
devalued and their assets to be revalued. Both these activities will speed up the depletion of
foreign exchange reserves of the country in question and will make speculators rich if the
devaluation is coming about. If there are no deficits the foreign exchange disequilibrium can
come about because of changes in expectations. In addition the models have been broadened
including a decision of the government to devalue in order to regain flexibility or to defend
the exchange rate in order to preserve credibility of the fixed exchange rate (see Obstfeld
1994). 
 Moreover, one can easily imagine that a shock of world economic recessions with its
increase in interest rates and the drop in exports also leads to overvaluations which can
provoke the same problem (see Ziesemer 1997a, Chap. 5.1 for sketch of this idea). Finally, a
permanent revaluation of Asian currencies in comparison to all other currencies except for the
dollar, when they are tied to the dollar and the dollar rises over time (from April 1995 until the
beginning 1998 because of foreign economic policy rather than domestic deficits), could also
provoke overvaluations and speculative attacks. Although the last two examples have not yet
been proven theoretically it is rather likely that it is possible to do so in the future.
A brief history of crises can be told as follows (see Ziesemer 1997a, Chap. 7 as a trace
to the original literature). The crises in the 1930s, 1870s, 1890s happened to occur as by-
products of world business cycle downswings. Lack of export revenues make the debt service
impossible. However, some of these crises also have their particular aspect, such as the drop
in guano prices stemming from the introduction of new variants of fertilizer in Peru 1876 or
the fact that debt service became due in 1890 in Argentina before the infrastructure
investment for which the loans had been used yielded any returns (development default).
However, in the 1890s most problems were domestically generated. In the 1930s the world
wide recession with high interest rates and the induced protectionism reduced export demand.
Prices of developing country exports often fell by 30 or 40 %. Obviously debt service
3payments become difficult then. For the 1982 crisis also high interest rates, a world economic
recession with its negative effects on export demand and an increase in protectionism are the
relevant element. Whereas it is debatable whether the interest shock was larger in the 1930s or
1982, it is rather clear that the drop in exports was more severe for all countries in the 1930s.
However, it is also clear that in the crises of 1930 and 1982 countries with less solid economic
policy have been suffering earlier and more severely. 
After the 1982 crisis there were several single country crises in Mexico. The one most
lively debated is that of 1994/5. Some authors have characterized it as a typical foreign
currency crisis. However, there are other explanations as well (see Journal of International
Economics 1996). Obviously, it is too early to decide on the debate here.
The Asian crisis on the one hand is not part of a world economic crisis; on the other
hand it is not a single country crisis. Although the latter view has some attractiveness because
the problems in these countries are very much different from country to country, in particular
the forms and extent of financial excess varying by country, there also must be something
international that these countries have in common; some say it is moral hazard, corruption etc.
whereas others say that it is the dollar revaluation. In this paper we shall introduce all the
views but ultimately we will emphasize the common value of dollar, yuan and yen and the
slow growth of Japan, which must at least explain why these countries came into trouble all at
the same time in the same region.  
1.2 From Asian development policy success to the debt crises
Recent empirical literature (see Young 1994; Collins and Bosworth 1996) has clearly
confirmed the standard wisdom in development economics that the Asian success is due to
increased inputs and not due to an outstanding performance in the enhancement of total factor
productivity. Employment participation has been increased for man and women. People have
received more education and the investment/GDP ratios have been outstandingly high. This
can be summarized as in the scheme 1 and table 1 below. There is a clear ranking in the orders
of magnitude in the growth rates of table 1: Obviously, the growth rate of the capital stock is
the largest of all these growth rates being in the order of magnitude of 10%. The second
largest is that of manufacturing employment being in the order of magnitude of 5-9%. The
third in ranking is human capital growth in the order of magnitude 2-5%. Finally, total factor
productivity growth ranks lowest being in the order of magnitude 0-2%. Another result of
high capital accumulation besides high growth is also large debt. 
Scheme 1. Factors of production, policies and results 
Production factor         Policy Results 
physical capital Savings and foreign debt high capital growth, large debt
human capital Education policy   Some high, some low
low skilled labour Employment cum population policy high employment, low population
growth  
Technology R&D TFP growth not higher than
OECD
4The interpretation of the data from the point of growth theory is also clear. If the long-
run growth rate of a country is determined by its total factor productivity growth rate as
neoclassical growth theory would postulate, and total factor productivity is growing no faster
than OECD countries do, in the long run growth rates of the Asian countries considered in the
tables must come down to those of the OECD countries. A slow down of growth towards its
natural rate (to be corrected for income and price elasticities of export demand see Ziesemer
1998) is a natural prediction - Krugman made it.    
Table 1. Growth rates of factors of production and total factor productivity
Country Korea Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Taiwan
Variable
TFPGR 1.4 0 1.9 1.0 1.5a
KGR 12.6 8.3 10.6 10 12.2b
HGR 3.3 4.5 2.3 3.3 2.8c
LGR 5.5 8.9 5.1 8.2 5.6d e e
a Annual total factor productivity growth 1970-1985; source: Young 1994; 
b Capital stock growth rate average 1960-94; source: Collins and Bosworth 1996.
c Average years of schooling, growth rate 1960-94; source: Collins and Bosworth 1996.
d Manufacturing employment annual growth 1970-90; source: Young 1994 unless
otherwise indicated.
e UNIDO Industrial Statistics Data Base.
An obvious problem with such a prediction is that firms need an expectations adjustment
towards growth rates of 1-2% from very high ones and they need to know when it will come
about; a question that can hardly be answered. In 1996 Korea, Indonesia and Thailand had
lower growth rates than before. The crucial question is whether or not this is the adjustment to
a new long-run steady state value determined by total factor productivity growth or merely a
transitory growth reduction due to the business cycle and an increasing dollar, which leads to
an appreciation of those currencies which are tied to the dollar - baht ringgit, peso, won etc. In
figure 1 the slopes of the bended curves are the growth rates if there is no impact of the dollar
value but rather the views from growth theory apply. The straight lines indicate steady state
growth paths. A transition form a lower growth path to a higher one initiated by the policies
indicated in column 2 of scheme 1 would lead to such a transitional path with first increasing
and later decreasing growth rates. A similar impression can be gained from the table 2 where
the average growth rates for three periods are presented and from figure 2 where the actual
growth of six countries is plotted. 
FIGURES 1 AND 2 OVER HERE
5Table 2. GDP average annual growth rates in %
Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 GDP per head 1995 $
Hong Kong 9.2 7.5 5.0 23,900
Singapore 9.4 7.2 8.3 22,600
Taiwan 10.2 8.1 6.3 13,200
Korea 9.3 8.0 7.7 11,900
Malaysia 8.0 5.7 8.8 10,400
Thailand 7.3 7.2 8.6   8,000
Indonesia 7.8 5.7 7.2   3,800
China 7.5 9.3 10.1   3,100
Philippines 6.1 1.8 2.8   2,800
Sources: IMF; ING Barings; national statistics; The Economist.
In terms of the upper more abstract graph derived from theory one could hypothesize that the
four richer countries are in the more advanced phase of the transition with decreasing growth
rates whereas the five poorer countries are in the less advanced phase of increasing growth
rates. Countries from both groups are severely affected by the debt crisis. Thus being in one of
these phases per se does not make a country more prone to being affected by the crisis.
However, it cannot be excluded from consideration that international investors may have
recognized the phase of increasing and high growth rates of all these countries but have not
recognized all to the same extent that some of these countries are already in the phase of
decreasing growth rates. Such a lag in recognizing changes in growth rate developments may
have contributed to too much optimism about the bubbles at the stock exchanges of all these
countries which later led to some plunge (see table 3 below) in all of these countries.
The above reasoning being mainly based on closed economy growth considerations,
one has to add the trade impact on growth: the slow down of growth in Japan will probably
slow down the growth of the whole Asian bandwagon because Asian countries can export less
to Japan.    
The growth of the Asian economies has been based on industrial policy and not just
the laissez faire captured by standard growth theory. It is well known that the ‘tigers’ have
gained their world market shares at the cost of other developing countries, not the developed
countries (see Todaro 1994). Moreover, they are taking over industries from each other. One
often mentioned fact is that this may have led to overcapacity in Asia. What was coordinated
at the national level in earlier years was not coordinated internationally in more recent years
and also the national coordination did not work any more in some countries (see below).
Again it is an interesting question whether or not international investors have been alert
enough to see this type of a problem. 
2. The structure of the Asian debt crisis
2.1 Different views: where are the controversies?
Sachs’ view : sound fundamentals, almost pure panic. Unlike Krugman (see below) Sachs2
de-emphasises corruption and mismanagement. Economic reforms and financial liberalization
in the Asian economies have attracted capital inflows. This induces an appreciation of the
currencies. What investors rarely understand, he argues, is that during a later  phase of debt
6services this appreciation has to be replaced by depreciation in order to generate the necessary
export revenues. Banks being under-capitalized bear little risk themselves and expected bail-
outs secure them from risk. A combination of rising wage costs, competition from China and
lower demand for Asian exports, all in connection with a revaluation of their currencies which
were tied to the dollar which in turn appreciated, caused exports to stagnate. Foreign capital
being invested in the non-traded sectors such as real estate banks and companies became
unable to service debt. The result is a bank run although fundamentals are in order:
government budgets are in balance or surplus, inflation is low, private savings are high,
economies are poised for export growth. Although Sachs sees that there are current account
deficits, overvalued exchange rates and a need for financial reform, he seemingly does not
count these aspects as part of the fundamentals. It is here where Krugman differs in his view.   
    
Krugman’s view: moral hazard , national asset bubbles . Krugman (1998a) has provided3
an interesting theory on the Asian debt crisis. In his view the essence of the crisis is a
combination of moral hazard and asset bubbles. The argument in brief runs as follows.
Suppose a government provides a guarantee for one bail out to financial intermediaries if they
have bad luck and make losses. These intermediaries will ignore the possibility of bad
outcomes of there projects because the government provides guarantees for these cases.
Therefore they have higher expected returns than without government guarantees which
encourages them to invest more than without the guarantees. Asset prices will therefore be
artificially high. If bad luck occurs (a slump in the semi-conductor market and the rise of the
dollar did trigger the crisis,  but any little thing could have done so; see Krugman 1998c and
below) or creditors don’t believe in the future existence of the guarantees, the latter become
due and investors have to take into account the possibility of future bad luck - now without
guarantees - , therefore they calculate lower returns and invest less then before in these assets.
Asset prices plunge. Foreign financial investors withdraw there money and, as an inessential
by-product to the logic of the crisis the exchange rate collapses because of a reduction in the
demand for the currency of the country in crisis. Moreover (see Krugman 1998b), as the
guarantee, which was not given for foreign (direct) investors, vanishes, with less of a
discrimination foreign direct investors now have a fair chance and buy Asian firms. This is an
increase in efficiency to the extent that FDI sales are not merely due to the fact that the asset
prices overshot into the downward direction.  
Moral hazard and asset bubbles may indeed be an important aspect of the crisis.
Moreover, Krugman is aware of some limits of this view, some of which we will discuss in
passing below. However, we have some more points of reservation. But before spelling them
out we look at other views.
Stiglitz’ view : between Sachs and Krugman. Stiglitz would agree with Sachs on the fact4
that there are many sound macroeconomic fundamentals. However, he differs from both Sachs
and Krugman in pointing out misguided exchange rate and monetary policies, which are also
part of the fundamentals. He would agree with Krugman that insufficient financial regulation
and implicit or explicit government guarantees, poorly managed financial liberalization,
misallocation of investment towards the real estate sector, unhedged short-term borrowing,
high debt-equity ratios, are all weak microeconomic and institutional fundamentals. 
What Stiglitz implicitly suggests is to broaden the set of fundamentals from a set of 
mere macro indicators to one of macro and micro indicators.  This he has in common with
Alan Greenspan’s view.
7Greenspan’s view: global stock market boom, overvaluation. Greenspan (1997) starts out
from the observation of the World Bank that net inflows of long-term debt, foreign direct
investment, and equity purchases to the Asia Pacific region were only about $25 billion in
1990, but exploded to more than $110 billion in 1996. Greenspan’s explanation is that in the
global stock market boom - an aspect completely under emphasized by Krugman - of the
1990s, investors diversified their portfolios because they were heavily concentrated in the
developed world where they had low rates of return. The money moved into the real estate
sector of developing countries and these assets then served as collateral in a domestic
financial system with lax lending standards, weak supervision and inadequate capital. The
revaluation of the dollar to which these countries’ currencies were tied made their exports less
competitive. Current account deficits became unsustainable - an aspect completely de-
emphasised by Sachs. “The pressures on fixed exchange rate regimes mounted as foreign
investors slowed the pace of new capital inflows, and domestic businesses sought increasingly
to convert domestic currencies into foreign currencies, or, equivalently, slowed the conversion
of export earnings into domestic currencies. The shifts in perceived future investment risks led
to sharp declines in stock markets across Asia, often on top of earlier declines or lackluster
performances.”
Note that Greenspan does not say why there was a shift in perceived risk. However, he
does seem to say that the speculative attack preceded the plunge of the stock market, whereas
Krugman seems to say the opposite. For Thailand Greenspan (1998) is more explicit on this
point: “..., it was apparently the lethal combination of pegged exchange rates, high leverage,
weak banking and financial systems, and declining demand ... that transformed the correction
into a collapse. ... The belief that local currencies could , virtually without risk of loss, be
converted into dollars at any time was shattered. Investors, both domestic and foreign,
endeavoured en masse to convert to dollars, as confidence in the ability of the local economy
to earn dollars to meet their fixed obligations diminished. ... the weakening of growth also led
to lowering profit expectations and contracting net capital inflows of dollars. ... The
combination of continued strong demand for dollars to meet debt service obligations and the
slowed new supply, destabilized the previously fixed exchange rate regime. ” Finally, we
would like to state that Greenspan seems to have a clear view on the relation “ ...dangers of
depositor run, following a fall in the domestic currency, escalate.” This means that the
speculative attacks precede the bank runs.
In Greenspan (1998) it is stated that moral hazard is a problem. However, it is also
pointed out that some investors did suffer losses in the Asian crisis: Asian equity losses,
excluding Japan, since 1997 worldwide are estimated to have exceeded $700 billion of which
more than $30 billion has been lost by US investors. Substantial further losses have been
recorded in bonds and real estate. This is confirmed by Fischer (1998).
Fischer’s view: Pegged too long at high external deficits. Fischer (1998) emphasizes large
external deficits and bubbles in property and stock markets. Pegged exchange rate systems
have been maintained too long. That has encouraged external borrowing, with current account
deficits strongly differing by country. Lax prudential rules and financial oversight led to a
deterioration of the quality of loans. In the case of Thailand a confluence of domestic and
external shocks revealed theses weaknesses. 18 months prior to the floating the government
ignored IMF warnings and recommendations. However, Fischer does not discuss the moral
hazard problem of governments bailing out domestic investors and attributes no role to
international stock market developments. Speculative attacks are not mentioned but rather it is
pointed to the hedging activities of domestic investors.
8As none of the authors refer to the others the controversies are very implicit. As a comparison
of several positions is not a very easy task, we will summarize the various positions in scheme
3 below, making a distinction between the authors and whether or not they emphasize certain
aspects in their explanation of the crisis. The emphasis on these aspects as explanatory factor
are merely indicated by a crude distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’, hopefully doing no
injustice to any author. Below we will briefly interpret scheme 3 by way of just looking at the
minority positions concerning each of the major explanatory factors. 
Scheme 3. The matrix of implicit controversies
Author Sachs Krugman Stiglitz Greenspan Fischer  
Explanatory
factor
micro and institutional
fundamentals low high high high highc
domestic macro Monetary
fundamentals low low policy low lowa
international (un-)sustainable
fundamentals low low low current acc. highb
moral hazard low high high high low
national bubbles low high high high high
international Diversification
stock markets low low low withdrawal low
overvaluation high low high high high
speculative 
attacks high low high high low
a national savings, government budget deficit, monetary policy and inflation,
commitment to education, technologically advanced factories, egalitarian income
distribution, aggressive pursuit of foreign exports  (Stiglitz’ definition).
b debt/GDP ratio, debt service/export ratio, current account, (foreign exchange reserves
and adequate exchange rate treated separately)
c  regulatory system, corporate governance, transparency (Stiglitz’ definition)
We think it is obvious that the microeconomic fundamentals, moral hazard and
national bubbles matter although Sachs and partly Fischer, both being advisors to
governments, are de-emphasising them. We will discuss this item in section 2.2 under the
header of financial excess. What we want to figure out there is i) that this aspect differs from
country to country in an interesting way and ii) why bubbles burst: bad luck or
overvaluations? 
9Concerning domestic fundamentals all authors attribute a low importance to them with
the exception of Stiglitz. All authors seem to agree that there is no problem with domestic
fundamentals. Stiglitz’ point concerning monetary policy is not explained explicitly but has to
be understood in connection with his view that no inflation problem did exist. Supposedly he
believes that monetary policy has been too strict. Is this reasonable under fixed exchange
rates? Is there really no role for the fiscal deficits of these countries? Were inflation rates quite
low so that the conventional currency crisis argument does not work? We discuss domestic
fundamentals in section 2.3.
The only authors emphasizing the relevance of international fundamentals and stock
markets are Fischer and Greenspan. Is the role of foreign debt and the current account really
limited to capital flight and herding behaviour per se or do they play a role in the expectation
formation of foreign investors? The question whether national bubbles (Krugman) or
international stock markets are most important (Greenspan) is also worth some consideration.
Krugman pretends that boom-bust cycles precede the speculative attack and the fall of the
exchange rate whereas Greenspan seems to say the opposite. Have the boom-bust cycles prior
to the currency crises themselves been preceded by the dollar revaluation? These issued are
briefly discussed in section 2.4.
The discussion in 2.4 will raise the question whether fixed exchange rates are viable
when the dollar is rising for a long time but all other types of fundamentals are in order. We
will argue in section 2.5 that this is not possible when the dollar rises far and long enough.
And Stiglitz would probably add that flexible exchange rates give more room for less strict
monetary policy.
All authors in some way agree that contagion or herding behaviour matter. Do we
really have a case of herding behaviour explaining contagion under conditions of few
economic links with the initial victims or are the links underestimated?  This will be
considered in section 2.6.
  Finally, a point raised by Krugman himself is why the financial crisis produces such
large slumps in growth in connection with real devaluation: is there a role for the size of debt
in explaining the extent of the devaluation and a role for imported inputs in explaining the
transmission to growth? And what about the credit crunch? We address this in section 2.7
2.2 Forms of financial excess and the problem of forecasting
i ) Financial excess I: moral hazard and asset bubbles: speculation on land, real estate and
stocks in Japan and Thailand . 
The Japanese  recession is lasting already seven years. The stock exchange and land5
prices fell already in the eighties. In the nineties real estate prices fell by 60% and the stock
exchange by 50%. Twelve banks have been closed. The growth rates of the GDP have gone
down to between one and zero percent or even negative in 1997 from 3,5% in 1996 to -11,2%
in the second quarter of 1997. Unemployment as measured by the OECD is 6,5%. 40% of
Japanese exports go to its Asian neighbours, which makes Japan rather sensitive against the
Asian debt crisis. The 125 million inhabitants produce a GDP of $4200 billion, which is ten
times that of Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia together. The trade surplus was
$132 billion in 1995. The value of foreign owned assets is $1000 billion of which $300 billion
are owned by American citizens. The major debtor in the crisis region is Hongkong, a fact
which gives some safety to the Japanese and the world system as long as Hongkong is not a
10
major problem in the crisis. Central bank reserves are the highest in the world: $230-330
billion depending on the source 
Table 3. Financial aspects of the crisis
Country Korea Indon. Thailand Malay.  Jap. Philip.
Crisis features
debt/head 156/45; 144/200 90/60 < 45/a
debt/GDP 156/435 144/190 90/130 10/42
devaluation >69 >142 <84 >54 <13 <56c
x%/$  b
financial Chaebol; family Bureaucrac. 
excess
bubbles SE  SE SE, land SE land, real estate,SEd
major credit. Japan.  Japan(>22bn), 37,5bnJap. USA
and US NL 5%of 144 banks
banks Deut.Bank$10b.
Chaebols!e
IMF prog. bil.$s 57 43 17 none Cont.
Hongk. Taiw. China India Singap. Vietnam 
devaluation >19 10 11 <21 > 5
x%/$ (max.)
Financial excess SOEs
Corruption
Bubbles SE 15%real estatef
SE?
major creditor Japan S-Korea
a values are those revealed afer the debt crisis after it had turned out that official data of
the IMF and BIS suffered from underreporting; GDP and debt are measured in billion
dollars and population in millions. 
b With the exception of the values for China, India and Vietnam which are collected
from the daily press these values are taken from “A Chart of the Collapsing
Currencies” from “ http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/chart.html” . Exchange
rates on Dec 16 1997 are compared to those of Jan 2 1997.
c  Since April 1995 the yen has lost 30% against the dollar.
d Stock exchange
e Chaebols are owners of Korean banks (Time Magazine Jan 12 1998)
f This was at least partly due to the introduction of a 100% tax on profits from selling
buildings within one year. 
Other sources: Economisch Statistische Berichten, Financial Times, J.P. Morgan (Robert E.
Litan 1998), de Volkskrant; Die Zeit;
and the valuation. Households have cumulated savings of $10.000 billion, twice the GDP
value although there is strong financial repression limiting interest rates received by
households to 0.5%. Reforms in all areas of society are overdue (in particular in regard to the
11
sokaiya phenomenon) because the planning of the social system had been based on a growth
expectation of 6%. Here the long-run trend of slowing down growth rates as motivated by
figure 1, which has reduced export growth in Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines, has
still to be taken into account. The Japanese crisis is mainly one of the banking sector - to
which the combination of moral hazard and asset bubbles applies - and will remain being so 
unless Hongkong is becoming part of the debt crisis or many countries’ reduction of growth
really harms Japanese exports. So far Japan has been important for the onset of the crisis
because of its slow down of growth and the devaluation of the yen which contributed to
starting up the crisis and the above mentioned reduction in export growth of other countries.
In table 3 the devaluation is only 13% for the 1997 but compared with April 1995 the
devaluation against the US dollar is 30%.  
In Thailand  the crisis broke out on July 2 1997. The stock market index had gone6
from 1400 in 1995/6 down to 700 in beginning of 1997. Until the end of 1996 20% of the
loans lent to property investors had gone bad. Its exchange rate was tied to a basket of
currencies dominated by the dollar but not in line with their trading pattern and as the dollar
had strengthened against the yen so had the baht for more than two years and therefore, in
connection with the weak growth in Japan, exports fell in 1996. Thai banks had borrowed in
dollars and lent in baht where the interest rate was much higher, indicating an expected
devaluation. This means that they gambled on stability and lost later in July. Somprasong
missed payments on foreign debt in February 1997. The Bank of Thailand defended the baht
on Feb 14 spending $500m after Moody’s had announced a downgrading of Thai debt. On
march 3rd trading in bank and finance-company shares had been suspended. 400 billion baht
($15bn) of property loans have gone bad before may 17. By may 15 the baht was hit by an
unsuccessful, massive speculative attack. The central banks of Thailand and Singapore
intervened and drove the interest rate to 1300%; the stock market did go to an eight year-low
falling by 65% since the start of 1994. On May 23 Finance One, Thailand’s largest finance
company, could not be saved. On June 19 the minister of finance resigns because his
resistance against devaluation is no longer accepted and the Thai baht plunges for the first
time at a large amount. On June 27 the Thai cental bank suspends operations of 16 cash-
strapped finance companies and announces the managed float on July 2 after assuring that
there will be no float on June 27 - domestic credit had reached a level of 160% of GDP.
Unhedged borrowers of dollars go bankrupt because of increased costs of servicing debt. On
July 28 Thailand calls the IMF (and the Reserve Bank of Australia after having been denied
help from Japan (the largest creditor country), Singapore and China) which announces a
package of $17 bn on August 11. The ensuing credit crunch together with the devaluation will
hamper imports of capital goods and slow down the transition to more capital-intensive
production which needs more imported capital goods. Moreover, from October 1997 till
October 1998 another $40bn fall due. More detailed information can be taken from table 3. To
sum up, the revaluation of the dollar preceded non-successful attacks, leading to the fall of the
stock market index, and finally successful speculative attacks. For Thailand we can safely say
that the dollar revaluation and the property price bubble preceded non-successful speculative
attacks and the stock market decline preceded a successful speculative attack. The crisis did
also spill to other financial markets.   
Malaysia had provided incentives to merge banks before July and to open for foreign
banks, but this had almost no effect. The antiquated financial system has suffered from
property lending as in Thailand. Current account deficits were large (see table 4 below) and
politicians seem to have an inclination towards prestige projects, however, without generating
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a large government deficit (see table 4 below). Overbuilding in the property sector is much
less than in Thailand. After the devaluation of the baht on July 2nd, a speculative attack has
been fought successfully raising overnight interest rates to over 50%. More flexibility of the
ringgit is allowed for on July 11th. President Mahatir’s attacks against Mr. Soros began end of
July when the devaluation of the ringgit had been no more than 10% (not more than European
currencies had lost against the dollar)  - the larger part of the 54% denoted in the table 3 was
still to come. Mahatir’s attacks against speculators provoked fears of capital control leading to
another fall of the ringgit by 4% on October 1st, reducing its value to 25% below that of July.
As a result the until September the stock market had lost 40% during 1997. For Malaysia we
can safely say that the causation goes from speculative attacks to the stock market. The crisis
is a consequence of that in Thailand which in turn was caused by property bubbles and a fall
in the stock market both after devaluation of the yuan and the yen and the revaluation of the
dollar.
The Philippines are the poorest of the countries in Table 2. In 1985 82% of the
children were malnourished according to UNICEF. In 1991 47% of the islands population
were living in poverty. Recently they had high growth rates (export growth for 1997 was
expected to be more than 20% or even 30% before the crisis), a central bank with a reputation
for independence and tough supervision and foreign banks which had raised the standards of
banking. The government did raise capital requirements in December 1996. However, the
banks had nevertheless been involved with property woes. Middle of May the country is
affected by the speculative attack, right after that on Thailand; on June 19th the interest rate is
raised to 15%, and to 24% on July 3rd and to 30% after an attack on July 7th. On July 11th the
peso floats freely and falls by 10,5%, which became 56% over all 1997. The stock markets did
plunge as well. Property woes had made the country sensitive for a speculative attack
although fiscal deficits and the current account are rather small (see table 4 below).  
ii) Financial excess II: moral hazard with and without asset bubbles: From Petrobras to the
Chaebols in Korea.  
In Korea the moral hazard phenomenon is best known  in regard to the Chaebols, large7
conglomerates which had access to much credit because of its good relations to the
government. This exaggerated excess to credit was one of the reasons why it was possible for
Korea to leave the strategy of increasing returns by picking the winners. Large firms using
credit money to produce the same goods as their domestic competitors are a drastic change in
strategy. However, this all was known long before and it is structurally similar to the role of
Petrobras in Brazil and the SOEs in other countries in the 1982 crisis (although the connection
with the stock exchange may be stronger in the Asian debt crisis). The only question was
when the trouble would come to burst out. Although Korea  was told to have its capital8
markets much less liberalized then other countries it turned out after the outbreak of the crisis
that they had received too large a volume of loans (see table 3) - with no obligation to disclose
information, let alone make provisions against, all of their suspect loans. Growth rates had
become slightly smaller since the beginning of the 1990s and some Koreans had already
understood that there long-run growth would be that of the increase in productivity and that
the transition indicated in figure 1 may be more or less over. It was also known that many
firms owing credit were virtually bankcrupt, and loans had to be paid back within one year
and even earlier the practices of inefficient use of capital and labour due to corruption etc.
were warned against. After the downturns in the semiconductor, metals and petrochemicals
businesses in 1995 and 1996, firm bankruptcies were more or less a continuous event in
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Korea: Hanbo collapsed in January 1997, Sammi in March, Jinro (rescued) end of April, Kia
was close to collapsing in July, Korea First Bank was rescued in August, and in October
Sangbangwool came into trouble. The debt-equity ratios of more than 170 large companies are
larger than 500%, the largest 300 having ratios three times as high as large American firms.
Moreover, the stock exchanges of Thailand and Korea had been developing much worse in
1996 than those of other emerging markets, a clear sign of caution from investors (ECN 97
Feb 22). By March 31st 38 firms of the Korean Stock Exchange had recorded a combined loss
of $700m on proprietary trading. In April 1997 the president of Korea had come up with a
financial reform package trying to rescue banks by involving the chaebols, who partly own
them, obliging banks to extend credit even to firms that have defaulted before and setting up a
Korea Asset Management Corp to buy loans at a discount from banks and then try to recover
the lost funds, thus financing the bail-outs. Nevertheless a credit squeeze is beginning to
hamper the industrial sector in June. Obviously the outbursting of the crisis could have been
prevented if earlier measures had been taken and the problems had not been hidden by
falsifying statistics: In the official statistics total debt as a share of GDP was no higher than
15%; however, table 3 indicates that it turned out to be $156bn which is more than 40% of the
GDP of $366bn (or only $238bn according to table 2; value depend on the exchange rate used
in the computation) and even higher if the devaluation is taken into account when computing
the GDP in dollars. The logic here clearly goes from sectoral problems and moral hazard on
the side of the chaebols to the stockmarket and from there to a devaluation.  
iii) Financial excess III: more than just moral hazard: families, corruption and all that 
in Indonesia. 
The political situation in Indonesia is what Krugman has in mind. Corruption, a shaky
banking system, the slow pace of deregulation and dismantling of monopolies, and a lack of
legitimacy forcefully expressed by the omnipresence of soldiers and the screening of
campaign speeches in Indonesia are well known. Moreover, due to deregulation since 1983,
the number of commercial banks exploded in Indonesia. But the country’s central bank failed
to step up its monitoring of the risks involved. Banking scandals and collapses became
commonplace because of dodgy loans to families and conglomerates. As the Philippines and
Malaysia, the country has large foreign debt (see table 3), but lower current account deficits
than the Philippines (see table 5) but higher inflation of 10% before and 60% after the crisis
(see table 4). Much bank lending going to property investment (three quarters of the land are
owned by the government), a fixed exchange rate with the dollar and slowing of exports. It
dropped the band and allowed the rupiah to float on August 14. However, the trouble did go
as far as (see table 3) a devaluation of 142% and a debt of $144bn (after official data told it
was $55bn before the crisis) that is larger than that of Brazil and Mexico was in 1982 (each
about $100bn), although Indonesia is much poorer. The IMF program of about $43bn is
correspondingly large. Non-solid policies on all relevant aspects except for fiscal and current
account deficits, the IMFs most beloved criteria, have made the country sensitive for
competitive devaluations and speculative attacks.   
iv) Financial excess IV: The situation in China can be summarized as fragile banking with
little foreign capital and real effects. The Chinese banking system (see ECN 97 Apr12) is
characterized as ‘primitive, state-dominated, unstable and mired in debt’. One fifth of all loans
have turned sour. Transparency is characterized as ‘very poor’ by Moody’s. Why then has
China not been part of the crisis? The yuan has been undervalued in January 1997. The central
bank of China has accumulated large reserves by buying dollars, thus exerting upward
pressure on the yuan. Its current account is in surplus and capital inflows are of long term
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loans, not short-term. Therefore may be the yuan is unchanged until April 1998 since its
devaluation in 1994?  
A similar case is Vietnam. Growing at 9%, foreign aid and investment are coming in 
and inflation is under control. However, state banks lending to state owned enterprises as well
as corruption pose some problems. The current account deficit is 15% and reserves are low, at
$1.6bn. The debt is owed to Korean companies. Viet Hoa Bank has refused to repay some
deposits in May 1997. Information is the worst of all countries here. After the crisis there has
been a devaluation of 5%. 
v) No financial excess: no real crisis occurred  after the crash of the stock exchange in
Hongkong and Taiwan. 
The Hongkong-dollar is unchanged until April 1998. Property prices were rising
through May 1997. The Hang Seng Index drove to records until July 3rd, the day after the
baht devaluation. Expectations of bursting bubbles were first formulated in ECN 97 Jul 12.
Interest increases on August 15th to defend the Hongkong dollar let the stockmarket plunge
by 2.4% and 4% on the next trading day. Reserves were high enough to fight the attack.
However, when Mahatir attacked Soros even the Hongkong stockexchange did fall 15% and
again in October speculators did try to find out whether the authorities are willing to defend
the overvalued HK dollar inspite of increasing interest rates. Asset bubbles without moral
hazard need not be harmful. The question, however, is whether or not the Hongkong currency
board could have survived if the increase of the US dollar to which it is tied had been going
on longer. For Hongkong it is clear that the causality goes from speculative attacks to the
stockmarket.  
No high debt, large reserves, no financial excess could be seen in Taiwan. Property
markets had been down since medio 1994. Concerning shares the Taiwan Weighted Index
rose by 34% in 1996 and the Over-the-counter securities market (OTC) by 136%; growth in
issuance outstripped growth in money supply in July 1997, indicating a coming slow down.
The defence of the NT dollar in October did increase interest rates, driving the stock exchange
index down by 20% since August. Taiwan has the world’s third largest reserves. Taiwanese
firms started buying firms in Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia in 1998.
Devaluations had been modest in comparison to the crisis countries and the current account is
in surplus as in Singapore (see table 3). For Taiwan it is clear that the causality goes from
speculative attacks to the fall in the stockmarket.    
Who speculates and who gains? As in earlier Mexican crises, in East Asia biggest
sellers of local currencies have been not speculators but local firms trying to hedge or repay
debts denominated in dollars. It is remarcable that in Thailand the banks report losses from the
stock divisions but gains from the foreign exchange divisions for 1997.  Maybe President
Mahathir can gains some information from investigating Malaysian banks. From this point of
view a profit tax on foreign exchange gains may be an alternative for the Tobin tax worth a
discussion. The question is whether or not it could be as successful as the tax on profits from
land and real estate speculation imposed by Singapore.
But we also want to question the view that moral hazard can generate an asset bubble
in stock markets of an open economy with capital flows. The point is that foreigners and
domestic people seeing that governments induce inefficient measures which have an effect
towards generating bubbles will know these inefficicies and the high probability that these
bubbles burst. If they therefore do not put their money into these stockmarkets but rather keep
out the net effect may be having no bubble at all. The question is how many actors are that
rational and well informed. 
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 2.3 The role of domestic fundamentals: Were fiscal deficits and inflation irrelevant?
Boonstra and Möller (1998) argue that inflation was a bit higher in these countries than in the
US although deficits were moderate or even absent (see table 4 below). Currencies being tied
to the dollar become overvalued. Current accounts did get negative and money inflow did
finance this. Short term lending did prevail. This is the classical situation of currency crises
although it does not need high deficits (the major example of the early literature on currency
crises; see Krugman 1997b) to have inflation. However, it is important for such a claim to
have also decreasing reserves. Moreover, in Korea and Malaysia the inflation rate was only
marginally larger than that of the US. Here it is more promissing to search for a role of the
revaluation of the dollar (to which these currencies were tied) and the devaluation of the yen
(which increased Japan’s export prospects) if there is anything at all that can undermines
Krugman’s position. Given this macroeconomic information one could also argue that the
speculative attack would have come anyway; property woes and weak chaebols made them
merely successful at a somewhat earlier date.  
Stiglitz believes that monetary policy is inadequate. This is hard to judge about because a less
anti-inflation oriented policy is possible only under flexible exchange rates. An option that has
not been chosen by the countries in question and not even by the developing countries that had
been hit hardest in the 1982 crisis. They have merely broadened the bands of more or less
fixed exchange rates (see Calvo et al. 1994).
Table 4 
Country Korea Indon. Thailand Malays. Vietnam
Fiscal deficit -0.2 0.7 -0.8 1.3
Inflation %e.a. 4,3 10 7 4,1 Lowa
Inflation %e.p. 60b
Reserves, $bn 1,6
debt due next
2 years $bn 74 38 50c
... and divided
by reserves in% 200  200 120
a 1997 before the crisis; Source: Boonstra and Möller (1998)
b After the crisis
c According to Peter Mortagnon, The bamboo curtain rises, Financial Times, 1/30/98.
Table 5
Country Korea Indon. Thailand Malay Singa. Taiw. Philip. Jap. Vietnam
current acc.
Surplus %GDP a
1996 -4.9 -3.4 -7.9 -6.3 15.2 4.0 -4.5 -15
1997 -2.7 -4.5 -4.2 -9.9 16.2 1.8 -2.9     
a Sources: J.P. Morgan, Financial Times, Robert E. Litan
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2.4 The role of international fundamentals and the US dollar revaluation
Concerning international fundamentals we see from scheme 3 that Greenspan and Fischer
emphasize them more than the other authors. De Ruyter van Steveninck (1998) and Boonstra
and Möller (1998), both bank employees, argue that the revaluation of the dollar made the
currencies of the crisis countries overvalued. In connection with a devaluation of the Chinese
yuan in 1994 and the Japanese yen, they argue that the current accounts became negative. This
made the stock exchange plunge. In connection with the difference in inflation discussed
above this may have led to the pessimistic expectation which are so crucial in Krugman’s
theory. From reading Krugman (1998a) and the view of Boonstra and Möller (1998) one
might get the impression that unlike Krugman these authors put financial excess into the
second most prominent place and the traditional arguments into the first place.  However,
Krugman is more clear on this point in his 1997b paper (page 11): the argument is that the
dollar revaluation undoubtedly came first but it was not directly followed by speculative
attacks but (before that) by the collapsing of the stock exchanges - at least in the case of
Thailand. What should be verified therefore is that the order of happenings is 1. Dollar
revaluation, 2. Collapse of stock exchange, 3. Speculative attacks and reductions of reserves.
 For Thailand we can say that indeed stockmarket went down in the beginning of 1997,
non-successful speculative attacks occurred in February and May, leading to another fall of
the stockexchange and finally the baht went down and floated in june and july respectively.
This is exactly the pattern krugman has in mind. For Korea the stockexchange went down in
1996 and attacks and evaluations came later; again krugman has it right. For all the other
countries, however, speculative attacks lead to high interest rates, a fall in the stockexchange
and finally to devaluations. Here the causality goes the other way around.  
Krugman’s point then is that speculative attacks are a consequence of the collapse of
the stock exchange and would not have happened without it from the dollar revaluation alone.
Moreover, Krugman (1998c) argues that inspite of the actual role of the dollar revaluation any
little thing could have triggered the crisis because a bubble was underway that will burst
anyway. However, we would like to argue, the revaluation of the dollar has led to more than
two years of increasing deficit accumulation on the current account, growing short term debt
and decreasing reserves in defence of the fixed exchange rate. The reversion of all these
developments may be rather costly and could have been prevented at least partly under
flexible exchange rates as in the 1982 crisis. Finally, after the baht floating there have been
many countries whose currencies came under speculative attack; these were exactly those
countries which had banking problems and too tightly fixed exchange rates - obviously
exchange rates matter here.
The crucial point might be that it is not just bad luck that has stopped the bubbles but
rather slow growth from Japan, the devaluations of the yuan, the yen and the revaluations of
the dollar. In brief, how obscure a bubble one can have depends on how large growth rates
are. If they fall bubbles burst (see Noland 1998 on this point).
2.5 The non-sustainability of fixed exchange rates when the dollar is rising
Stiglitz has recently gained some reputation as a protagonist of lax monetary policy. Of
course, he will know that this is out of reach with fixed exchange rate policy. The reason is
that it is standard knowledge now that fixed exchange rates can only be sustained if all other
policies are compatible with the target exchange rate (see Krugman 1997c). Otherwise a
country will induce speculation against its currency. Another standard lesson is that there are
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only two systems that can avoid speculation with certainty: monetary union and flexible
exchange rates. 
These two standard lessons, however, induce a question which seemingly has not been
explicitly treated anywhere: does there always exist a policy combination that can ensure a
fixed exchange rate or are there situations where a fixed exchange rate is not sustainable even
if all fundamentals are sound? This seem to be important questions because it is always the
debtor countries with fixed exchange rates which are hit most severely by the debt crises when
the dollar is rising. In 1982 these were the Latin American countries who did stick to fixed
exchange rates too long after Volckers anti-inflation policy raised interest rates and the value
of the dollar. In that crisis the Asian countries were praised for the exchange rate flexibility.
Now, in the Asian crisis, they themselves did stick to fixed exchange rates, a situation which
looks unsustainable. Why? The answer runs as follows.
Divide the world into three parts: the country in question, say Korea, the country to
which it ties the won, say the USA, and the rest of the world (ROW). As the won is tied to the
dollar we assume that the trade balance with the US will not change. Furthermore we assume
that it is balanced and by implication we can ignore the US part of the Korean trade balance
but not the trade balance with the rest of the world. Now suppose that the dollar is
permanently and continuously revalued and therefore the won is revalued vis a vis the
currencies of the ROW. Of course, deficits arise with ROW and overvaluation will attract
speculative atacks, unless monetary supply is permanently reduced and the country converges
to a monetary union with the US. The IMF did know this, but the Thais did not believe it.       
2.6 The Pro’s and con’s of contagion views. ‘Contagion’ is defined in various ways. Fischer
(1998) says that ‘some contagion reflected rational market behaviour’. Defined that broadly it
does not mean more then the spreading of a phenomenon, here the crisis. If this spreading is
based on the observation of large current-account deficits, property gluts and sizable unhedged
foreign debt, there is no doubt that contagion exists. Things become more controversial,
however, when it is claimed that contagion occurs, defined as the spreading of a crisis inspite
of no rational reasons but just sunspots. 
Typically, this argument then says that neither trade relations between two countries
nor portefolio interactions or any other rational arguments justify that the crisis spills over
from one country to the other. 
Rational contagion occurs when the crisis jumps from Thailand to its closest
competitors in exports. These competitors then also will have to devalue there currencies.
This in turn effects the currencies of again other competing countries which may be closer
competitors to the infected country than to Thailand. In Krugman’s view these relations do not
exist between Mexico and Argentina. However, the crisis of 1994/5 did spillover from
Mexico to Argentina; this could be called irrational contagion if no other rational explanation
is found. 
Another variant of rational contagion would be a spillover to countries from which
Thailand or Korea buy their imports: they have worse prospects for their exports.
  A third link, however, has not been debated. Some East Asian central banks have an
agreement to help each other in defending their exchange rates. If they really do so, and they
did, then they run down their reserves simultaneously. A change in the equilibrium exchange
rate with the yen, brought about by pegging to the dollar which was going up, and therefore
bringing pressure on the dollar exchange rate, will increase the probability of devaluation of
all these currencies if they have less reserves to defend them. Then, a common devaluation
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again does not reflect contagion but just a co-movement of reserves and the non-crediblity of
a successful defence.
A fourth link is the common weakness of the banking system. Any speculator could
read in The Economist from April 12, 1997 that dollars 250billion had been spent on cleaning
up banking crises in the past and that banks from Thailand, South Korea, China, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have or might shortly have banking problems if
property woes worsen. This seems to be rational reason enough to try a speculative attack one
month later after the baht had been floated, certainly in connection with the previous argument
of a common defence obligation - of course not for countries that have little short-term bank
loans like China and Vietnam.     
 When the Hongkong stock exchange fell end of October 1997 Latin American stock
exchanges lost about 15%. The Bombay stock exchange fell by 23%. Are the links
underestimated? Greenspan (1997) states that “One can debate whether the turbulence in
Latin American asset values reflects contagion effects from Asia, the influence of
developments in U.S financial markets, or home-grown causes.” So far contagion remains an
open issue (see also Doukas (1989) , Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)  and Ziesemer
(1997a, chap. 7.6) on this point. 
2.7 Causes and consequences of real devaluations. Consequences are more easy to analyse.
Krugman (1998a,c) frankly admits to be surprised how large the real effects of the crisis are.
He explains the real effects as follows. Partly, people feel poorer, depressing consumer
demand. Partly, low stock prices and high interest rates are depressing investment demand.
But also profitable companies are hamstrung by lack of credit. This sounds very much like a
non-international economists answer from one of the leading international economists. So
may be we should add that in all of these countries food is imported and capital goods are
imported and both become much more expensive after the devaluations. With more expensive
imported inputs investment may be less profitable. Even larger exports will hardly be able to
compensate this. Moreover, international trade credit seems to be a problem for some time
because as long as there is uncertainty about the value of the currencies and too much money
has been lent banks don’t borrow more money. This credit crunch inhibits growth in all debt
crises (for two possible formalizations see Ziesemer 1997a, 1997b, 1998). All these effects
will slow down growth as they did in the Latin American Debt Crisis, where trade balances
became positive mainly by reducing imports.  
3. Various aspects
3.1 Why didn’t anyone see the Asian Crisis coming?
 
This is an offen heard question not only after the Asian crisis had broken out, but also in the
1982 crisis. It should be clear that in both crises many had actually predicted the crisis. On the
1982 crisis the reader will find an interesting piece of literature in the comments on Solomon
(1977) and in a footnote in Sachs (1981).  
Here is Paul Krugman’s view on the Asian crisis.  “ ... Asians did invent a new kind of9
crisis, ...   An off-the-books crisis. ... hidden liabilities .... that weren’t exactly publicly
guranteed, that weren’t exactly not publicly guaranteed. ... a culture in which the line between
what is private and what is public was not well drawn, and we’re not used to that. We weren’t
used to it. We didn’t know how to read the statistics. We didn’t have statistics. The other
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thing is ... somone who said I see some risk out there tended to be argued down .... And so
people were lulled into a false sense of security. ” The first part of all these sentences sounds
familiar from what has been said after the 1982 crisis. That part of Krugman’s statement is
correct but not new. IMF, IIF and the BIS simply have not solved the observation problems,
although part of the information necessary has been available but not used (see endnote 7
again). The latter part is more convincing. Why? I would have put the answer to the question
of this section differently. 
First, most people are not busy with making predictions. 
Second, those who are making predictions do so because they have the incentive of
having put their money somewhere where risks may exist. If they have produced information
telling that risks are ‘out there’, the most stupid thing to do is to publish this information
because doing so makes others withdrawing there money which would devalue the publishers
own investment. Therefore they will be silent and try to withdraw their money without losses
before others have the information.
 Third, the supervisors of the investors and intermediaries like the IMF are afraid to
trigger panics and runs by publishing their information. However, the IMF has been in
dialogue with Thailand 18 months before the crisis. May be they predicted the crisis but did
not publish the prediction.
It seems to me that it is the latter point which needs some more sophistication. Of
course, the IMF should not publish news for the first time when they have bad news because
this could trigger a panic. What the IMF however, may be could do is to announce that it will
publish a system of debt indicators (see Ziesemer 1997a, chap. 9.1 for such a system) after a
year or two after the announcement. This gives time enough for badly performing economies
to bring their policies in order. The publications then would make sure that there is no
investment in badly governed economies and governments having to anticipate that would
keep their economy in order. Employment in the IMF would probably be restructured towards
cooperation with the BIS and IIF and the making of this information. However, the question is
whether or not the quality of the information which the IMF receives from the countries will
deteriorate. Countries now could improve there attractiveness to investors by presenting
themselves better with biased information, a problem well known from firm’s accounting
practices. If this problem cannot be overcome by supervision and control we may have to
choose between, on the one hand, the current situation of good IMF information which is not
available publicly but useful to the IMF job, and on the other hand between public but worse
information. The problem is whether or not national accounts etc. can be controled as good as
balance sheets of firms.     
3.2 Transmission to Europe and the USA
30% of US exports go to Asia (including non-crisis countries). These exports may decrease.
However, only 4% go to the MIT countries and the Philippines, and 12% to Hongkong,
Singapore, Korea and Taiwan, which are only slightly effected with the exception of Korea.
Japan sells 40% of its exports to developing Asian countries and Europe only 7%. As a share
of GDP it is only 2% for the USA and Europe and 4.4% for Japan. The direct effects will be
small for Europe and the USA. For Japan they will be less than a half  percent which is a lot in
times of negative growth rates. 
However,  the indirect effects are normally underestimated.
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The role of devaluations and overcapacity will probably be more important. After the
devaluations they may bring their foreign direct investment (fdi) home because exports
become more profitable relative to FDI. That could cost some jobs in the US and Europe. 
Finally, welath effects may come from ownership of Asian firms, which generate
capital losses for European and American firms who partly own Asian firms which are in
trouble. 
5% of dutch exports goes into the Asian region. In October 1997 there is no impact of
the crisis on dutch exports. 
 As the GDP of Japan is ten times that of Korea and ten times that of Thailand,
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, a one percent decrease of its growth rate does about as
large as a ten percent decrease in growth of either Korea or the other four countries. My
overall estimate is that neither of these events will do much harm in itself but together they
may.
 
3.3 Remarks on IMF policies 
Fischer (1998) defends the IMF policy of raising interest rates after the crisis pretending to
know the high interest rates are less damaging than large devaluation. It is hard to see on
which quantitative assessment this can be based. We are not claiming the opposite but we
want to point out that there seem to be some unclarified points about this. 
The problem is as follows. Suppose that without IMF interference there would be a
devaluation of 100%. What are the consequences for investors and consumers/workers? 
For an investor this would double the price of an imported machine. Now suppose
alternatively that IMF interference would increase interest costs by more than 100% but would
avoid some percentage points of the devaluation. The question then obviously is, is the
reduction in devaluation large enough to outweigh the costs of an increase in interest rates. Do
we have any quantitative assessment of this type of a problem or does Fischer just present an
informed guess?
For consumer/workers the problem is even more involved. If food is imported its
prices would also double. An increase in interest rates may, for example, increase the
unemployment rate from 5% to 12% and for the employed it may decrease the nominal wage.
The induced avoidance of devaluation would have an immediate benefit on consumer prices,
but employment and wages prospects would decrease. Can we say what is better?  
3.4 Is the Asian Miracle over?
On the one hand it seems premature, however, to conclude that the times of high growth rates
are over. If the ‘tigers’ will in the long run have the same TFP growth as the old OECD
countries, they may approach the same path as the latter. Hongkong and Singapore, having
still much lower incomes than other cities in the world, have of course some further potential
for catching up. The same is true for Korea and Taiwan which have reached income levels
comparable to the poorer old OECD countries but have quite a way to go to reach the levels of
the richer OECD countries. Moreover, Singapore, Hongkong and Taiwan are not strongly
affected by the crisis. 
However, if one does not believe in the TFP growth rate results used above (see
Krugman (1997a, last paragraph) the prospects of course may be more pessimistic. Moreover,
countries like Thailand and Indonesia have invested much less in human capital than the
others and may therefore expect an earlier slow down running into decreasing returns to
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capital and labour. Korea seems to have a serious conflict about the power of the chaebols
which the new president wants to split up and Indonesia has social unrest and is getting back
its migrants from Malaysia. Therefore for Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, the seriously
affected countries, the prospects are not too gloomy.   
The big questions, however, for all of these countries, will be whether or not the slow
down of Japanese growth will be replaced by growth of China and India and how long the
credit crunch keeps them from recovering. Latin America and Africa had a lost decade. World
economic growth is more favourable for the Asians than it was for them.  
3.5. Non-informative statements
Given all that has been said in this atricle the reader is warned of some undifferentiated
statements about the crisis that could be found in the business press. Here are two of them.
“SMH has 33 billion DM - 7% of its credit volume - invested in Sout-east Asia”. 
This suggests that the bank is highly endangerd. However, if they have most of their money in
Singapore and Hongkong as the Deutsche Bank has, this danger is much less because these
countries are hardly effected by the crisis. 
“European banks have DM 650 billion loans outstanding in the Asian region, German
banks more than DM 100 billion.” The same comment as before applies. For comparison,
Standard and Poor’s estimates that European banks have DM 260 billion in the four crisis
countries Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. That means that only 40% of these loans
are in the crisis countries. 
 
4. Summary and conclusion
The major arguments of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1. Although this is an ongoing debate , growth of the Asian economies seemingly came
predominantly from factor accumulation, not from total factor productivity growth and
therefore could be expected to slow down at some point in time.
2. All types of fundamentals - macroeconomic, institutional and other microeconomic,
domestic and international - should be taken into account when judging about risks.
3. Devaluation of the yuan, the yen, revaluation of the dollar and the growth slow down in
Japan all have induced a reduction of growth of exports of the Asian NICs.
4. In Thailand and Korea property and Chaebol woes preceded speculative attacks and
devaluations; in other countries speculative attacks came first. 
5. As in Mexico 1994/95, in Thailand (at least), some domestic sellers of domestic currency
did gain. Those who did loose could have known about the woes earlier.
6. In the problem countries inflation was higher than in the USA. Developing country
standards for inflation are irrelevant when the currencies are tied to the dollar.
7. Problems did arise in countries which had both, a weak banking sysytem and fixed
exchange rates. Deemphasizing any of these two aspects is somewhat arbitrary.   
8. Only monetary union or flexible exchange rates can avoid speculation with certainty.
9. Fixed exchange rates with the dollar are not sustainable if the rise of the dollar lasts long
enough.
10. Contagion, in the sense of irrational spillover of the crisis, remains a controversial issue.
Empirical research so far has not taken all relevant arguments into account.
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11. There exists a trade of between the secrecy and the publicness of crisis indicators: either
the information is secret and of good quality or the information is public but biased.
12. It is unclear whether fighting of imported inflation after a devaluation is necessary or
inflation will curtail itself because the purchasing power has decreased by the devaluation. 
13. Singapore, Taiwan and Hongkong will continue the ‘miracle’. Korea, Thailand and
Indonesia may undergo a difficult period if not a lost decade.
Appendix
Some more data of the crisis
summer 1997 spreads of 14 emerging market economies are no higher than 1 percent above
US government bonds. 
2 july 1997 devaluation of Thai baht; capital flight from Thailand and Malaysia.
Dec 1997 capital flight fromAsia, dollar up. The won has a low at 2000 won per $. By
mid-december more than $ 1 billion a day was flowing out of Korea.
Dec 18 Korean foreign-exchange reserves had fallen to less than $10 billion. Default
was 10 days away. Japanese stock markets dipped 10% and the Dow Jones 100 points.
Dec 21 1997 Mussa defends IMF by arguing that it has warned rather often against bubble
economies, unclear banking practices and risky speculation. As long as people
believe that money flows into these countries it will flow in and vice versa .   
Dec 23 1997 Seoul stock exchanges looses 7,5%, interest on 3 years obligations is 31%;
Japanese banks have already decided to prolongate Korean loans; other banks
inofficially announce to do the same .  Standard and Poor’s characterizes
Korean foreign debt as ‘junk bonds’ (repayment is doubtful). Moody’s gave a 
similar rating earlier.  Korean debt is estimated to be $200-250 bil.. 
Dec 29 1997   Korea announces comprehensive reforms of the financial sector. The won
increases by 7%. Korea’s unemployment rate goes from 2,1 to 2,6%.  
  The Japanese stock exchange has a ‘low of the year’. 
  Thai banks announce to have made twice as much profit from foreign
exchange trading than in the year before. 
Dec 1997 Japan premium one procent, but less in jan 1998.
Dec 30 1997 Commercial banks intend to give Korea an additional $10 billion in the form of
renewing short term credit contracts for 1,5 years. 
1998 Japanese government provides fl. 250bn. for banks.
Jan 1 Kim Dae Jung predicts Korea to need two years to solve the debt crisis.
Jan 15 1998 Soharto promises to give up friendship and family monopolies vis-a-vis IMF. 
Jan 16 1998 Standard and Poors sets rating of Korea from ‘negative ‘ to ‘developing’ 
Jan 17 Tokio stock exchange goes up again 
jan 20 dollar down, Lewinski/Clinton, money back to Asia?
26 jan, indon. rupiah still supported by central bank; 15300 rupiah /$ all time deep?
Jan 26 Indonesia announces moratorium with support of IMF.
Jan 29 1998 Korean short debt of $24 billion are rescheduled towards later repayment data;
intererst becomes LIBOR + 2,25-2,75% for these loans. IMF pays $8billion.
Citibank, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, JP Morgan, Bank of Nova
Scotia, HSBC Holdings, SBC Warburg-Dillon Read, Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi, Sanwa Bank, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Westdeutsche
Landesban, Société General. 
23
Jan30 1998 Indonesia expects two million mor unemployed for 1998 plus two million
school leavers who have rather low probabilities to find a job.
Alan Greenspan estimates the losses for international investors as hihg as $700
billion dollars.
Thailand wants $600million from the IMF to alleviate social problems.
Feb 2 1998 Standard and Poor’s estimates that European banks may loose up to $20 billion
of their loans in the Asian region. Profits before taxes could decrease by 75%.
Deutsche Bank increases it reserves by $1,4 billion. In Indonesia there are riots
because of price increases on food, and burning materials (kerosine). 
Feb 4 1998 The US governement invites 21 Asian countries for a conference on the future
prevention of economic crises. The IMF pays $ 2,8 billion to Argentina’s
reserves for potential problems. 
Feb 9 1998 Indonesian government unions expect to have 12,5 million unemployed of a
working population of 90 million by end of 1998. 
Feb 16 The Vietnamese dong is going down by 5%.
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Figure 1: Transition from a
steady state with a low growth
rate of GDP per capita to a
steady state with a high growth
rate.
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Figure 2: The lines represent the ln GDP of the following countries (from above at the end of
the lines): Japan, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Phillipines, China. 
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1. Information details that are presented without any source are taken from the business press:
The Economist, Time Magazine, deVolkskrant, DieZeit. I am grateful to Karen Kamp and
Bart Verspagen for the provision of very helpful information.
2.Sachs view has been expressed in a series of newspaper articles: “Personal view: Jeff Sachs”
in Financial Times, July 30, 1997; “The wrong medicine for Asia” in New York Times
November 3, 1997; “IMF is a power unto itself” in Financial Times December 11,1997.  
3.Except for the causality going from the plunge of the stock exchange and land prices to
devaluation, what Krugman (1998a) tells is a view also expressed by D. McDermott and D.
Wessel, FinancialSector Weaknesses Are Roiling Asian Currencies, The Wall Street Journal,
October 6, 1997. Also Noland (1998) sounds rather similar to Krugman’s argument. However,
he does not see moral hazard as a cause of asset bubbles.  
4. This is based on Joseph Stiglitz, Bad Private-Sector Decisions, Wall Street Journal,
February 4, 1998. 
5.This paragraph is based on information from Theo Sommer. Das entzauberte Modell, Die
Zeit, Nr.1, 26.December 1997 and other articles of the busines press, mainly The Economist.
6.This para is based on ‘Taking a baht / Thailand’s currency troubles’ The Economist, Feb 22
1997 and other articles from the Economist as well as Chronology of the Asian Currency
Crisis and its Global Contagion.  
7.See  the interview with David Crocket in DieZeit Nr.5, 22. January 1998.
8.Parts of this paragraph are based on Petra Pinzler, Problem vertagt, DieZeit, Nr.343, 17.
October 1997
9.Answer to Jim Lehrer in “Correcting the Crisis”, January 12, 1998, The NewsHour with Jim
Lehrer Transcript in ‘Online focus’, Online Newshour. 
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